WTO Working Papers

This paper explores the role of producer services and ICT on international outsourcing. The motivation for outsourcing is to focus on core business and improve efficiency and outsourcing companies usually outsource a number of functions and the efficiency gains depend on the ability for the suppliers to deliver the required quality at the right time. The timeliness of delivery and the fulfilment of quality standards depend critically on the availability of producer services. I therefore argue that international outsourcing can best be understood within an analysis framework of many suppliers that are interdependent, and the O-ring theory of production is such a theory. The paper first presents and modifies this model and then explores its predictions in an empirical analysis of the determinants of international vertical specialization as defined by an index developed by Hummels et al. (2001). The index is calculated for a cross-section of 52 countries and 5 sectors and regressed on a number of variables affecting the timeliness of delivery. It is found that vertical specialization is sensitive to trade barriers and infrastructure quality and cost of infrastructural services. The relative importance of trade barriers and various indicators of infrastructure vary between sectors. Vertical specialization in the electronics sector appears to be most sensitive to trade barriers and the density of the telecommunication network. This is also the case for the motor vehicles sector, but the size of the parameters is somewhat lower. The chemicals sector is most sensitive to the restriction on maritime services, while for textiles and clothing the aggregated measure of infrastructure had the highest explanatory power. Only in the electronics sector did the wage level (GDP per capita was used as a proxy) matter for vertical specialization.

This paper discusses how information and communication technology (ICT) affects the quality and reach of consumer services. These services need to be provided locally, but consist of several components, some of which can be digitised and transmitted over long distances. A general equilibrium model is developed and numerical simulations in a stylised two-factor, two-region, centre-periphery setting are presented. Trade in intermediate services improves the quality of consumer services enormously in the periphery, but may reduce the quality at the centre. Trade in intermediate services also has a dramatic impact on skilled workers’ wages in the periphery, both relative to unskilled workers in their own region and relative to skilled workers at the centre and leads to a more equal distribution of income both between the centre and the periphery and within the periphery.

The purpose of the paper is to discuss the effects of WTO accession on policy-making and institutional reforms in transition countries. This is done by looking at the experience of those transition countries which are already Members of the WTO. We start by examining the effect of accession on trade policy and distinguish between the effects of accession negotiations and those of autonomous policy initiatives. We find that no precise blueprint of accession conditions can be ascertained, that WTO played a role, albeit not an exclusive one in the process of liberalization, that the costs of WTO Membership are not negligible, that the benefits of WTO Membership are also significant in terms of a better market access, improved governance and a recourse to better economic policies.

Non-transparency is a term given in this paper to a set of government policies that increase the risk and uncertainty faced by economic actors foreign investors. This increase in risk and uncertainty stems from the presence of bribery and corruption, unstable economic policies, weak and poorly enforced property rights, and inefficient government institutions. Our empirical analysis shows that the degree of non-transparency is an important factor in a country's attractiveness to foreign investors. High levels of non-transparency can greatly retard the amount of foreign investment that a country might otherwise expect. The simulation exercise presented in the statistical part of this paper reveals that on average a country could expect 40 percent increase in FDI from a one point increase in their transparency ranking. Pari passu, non-transparent policies translate into lower levels of FDI and hence lower levels of welfare and efficiency in the host country's economy. A nation that takes steps to increase the degree of transparency in its policies and institutions could expect significant increases in the level of foreign investment into their country. This increased investment translates into more resources, which in turn increases social welfare and economic efficiency.

The revolution in the telecommunication industry of recent years raises a number of interesting economic questions with significant policy implications. One of these questions is the extent to which foreign investments in the telecommunication industry is accompanied by policies that are conducive to cross–border investments. These policies can be both domestic and international. The discussion in this paper is limited to the latter by concentrating on the role of the WTO and other international agreements. The purpose of the paper is to evaluate the GATS/Telecom Agreement. This is done by looking at the guiding principles for negotiating market access for foreign investors, by comparing the Agreement with the Telecom Agreement under NAFTA and by discussing the merits of the multilateral approach to negotiating foreign investment in the telecommunication sector. The WTO GATS/Telecom Agreement comes out rather well from this evaluation exercise.

Discussions about international capital movements raise extremely important and controversial questions. Why should countries open up their capital accounts, especially considering that unrestricted international capital movement is a relatively new phenomenon? For example, many OECD countries have not eliminated their foreign exchange restrictions only until the 1980's. If the answer is unequivocally affirmative, does it matter how fast should countries do so? Should they wait until "all essential pieces" of the policy package are in place before they eliminate all restrictions? How are international capital movements related to domestic financial sectors? Is there a difference between opening to competition an industry such as car manufacturing as compared to the banking sector? Should the opening of the banking sector be governed by different rules? Rules about foreign exchange restrictions are already in place in the IMF Articles. Until recently, the IMF Articles only called for the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions on the current account. The ongoing discussion and the controversy about globalization that calls for the capital account liberalization introduces, therefore, a relatively new element into the whole discussion. These questions have also implications for the World Trade Organization. It is well known, that the Uruguay Round Agreements have already provided a coverage for a number of aspects that are directly related to foreign investment. Rules established elsewhere such as in the context of changes to the IMF Articles will obviously have an important bearing for the implementation of rules agreed in the Uruguay Round. This raises a variety of other questions in the mind of some observers. Who should decide about the rules on capital account liberalization? What rules? IMF? What is the role of the WTO? How does one link the two? All of the questions raised above are clearly extremely important and most of them are discussed in the following paper by John Williamson. Mr. Williamson's presentation is based on his lecture and discussion which was delivered on 17 June 1999 at the WTO. The actual text that follows is a transcript of that lecture.

The customs union between the European Union (EU) and Turkey, which entered into force in January 1996, extended and deepened the Association Agreement, signed in 1964 and which foreshadows full EU membership for Turkey. In a number of areas, the new relationship goes beyond the minimum requirements for a customs union: Turkey is also having to implement a number of measures which are part of the acquis communautaire, similar to those applicable within the EU. This paper addresses the question whether this adoption of the EU model is beneficial to Turkey and third countries. The importance of this issue is the spreads of this model through the extension of the EU itself and the building of an increasing web of partnerships between the EU and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Mediterranean countries. Moreover, other regions are looking at the EU model as a way in which to deepen their own preferential trading arrangements.

This note discusses capital controls using insights from the trade policy literature. It highlights some key issues that have been neglected in the current international debate on capital controls. Capital is tradable in the same way as many goods and services are. As a result, much of the analysis pertaining to trade and trade policy in goods and services applies with equal force to capital movements. Free trade is typically the best trade policy, no matter whether it is trade in goods, services or capital. But if investor behaviour and the prevailing policy environment are not conducive to immediate free trade, the choice of instrument for controlling capital flows becomes important. Tariffs and other price-related restrictions are preferable to quantitative restrictions or prohibitions because: (i) they cause less rent seeking, and (ii) they do not insulate the domestic market from price changes and innovations in international markets.

It has sometimes been argued that "globalization" benefits only a small number of countries, and that this leads to greater marginalization of excluded countries. This paper argues that globalization is not necessarily biased towards greater concentration in international trade and investment flows. Marginalization is more likely to be explained by domestic policies in relatively closed countries. The paper shows that among relatively open economies, the concentration of international trade and investment flows has declined over the last two decades, whereas the opposite is true among relatively closed economies. Thus, marginalization is not intrinsic to globalization. Key Words: Globalization, international trade and investment flows concentration.

The paper studies empirically the fiscal policy instruments by which governments try to influence election outcomes in 24 developing countries for the 1973-1992 period. The study finds that the main vehicle for expansionary fiscal policies around elections is increasing public expenditure rather than lowering taxes, and public investment cycles seem particularly prominent. Institutional mechanisms which constrain discretionary expenditure policies and which strengthen fiscal control are therefore worthwhile considering to prevent opportunistic policy making around elections.